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This paper measures the market response triggered by merger announcements in an environment without regulations and without a strong separation of ownership and control in Germany. Based on event study methods applied to daily data and regression analyses, I evaluate whether the merger paradox existed, and how firm size, the way of financing a merger, and industry factors influenced the success of acquirers. Hence, my study can shed some light on commonly believed explanations for the bad performance of mergers. The whole portfolio of acquirers exhibited positive cumulated abnormal returns, which indicates a rejection of the merger paradox – but market values of some companies declined. Particularly, acquiring banks lost shareholder value, although the majority of mergers occurred in the banking industry. Caused by the new exchange law, banks were in a merger wave. Therefore, alternative explanations like the minimax-regret principle might explain why banks merged in spite of lacking success.
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I. Introduction
Event studies suggest that potential merger synergies accrue almost entirely to target shareholders, while “acquiring firm shareholders appear to come dangerously close to actually subsidizing these transactions.” (see Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001, p.111). Especially in the case of stock-mergers, merged entities (acquirer and target) exhibit negative abnormal returns.​[1]​ This phenomenon is often coined ‘merger paradox’ and can theoretically be explained by two major approaches. One is firm-specific and based on the principle-agent theory, while the other focuses on industrial organization and regulatory effects. My study analyzes whether an environment without agency costs and effective regulation allows profitable mergers for acquirers and targets. 
If my study finds different results, one can indirectly deduct the importance of the following two factors on merger performance: (1) From a firm-specific perspective, several theoretical and empirical studies explain the merger paradox with agency costs, i.e. free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), side payments and other private benefits (Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack, 2004, and Moeller, 2005), and empire building (Jarrel and Poulsen, 1989, and Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Thus, principle - agent problems related to ownership and governance structures are important factors for determining the profitability of mergers. (2) From a market perspective, Salant et al. (1983) uncovered that in a Cournot setting with homogenous goods and more than two firms, a free-rider problem arises when two companies merge. The merged entity has fewer profits than the non-integrated acquirer and target, and firms that do not participate in the merger can increase their outputs and profits. Lacking profitability of horizontal mergers and the strong belief that mergers are anti-competitive (see Boyer, 1992) triggered a new strand of literature that derives models that allow profitable mergers.​[2]​ Based on these game theoretical models, institutional changes like the introduction of monopoly commissions should play a crucial role for the success of mergers, as it limits the possibility to increase market power.​[3]​ Thus, anti-trust regulation is the market-specific factor that extracts monopolistic or oligopolistic rents from potentially profitable mergers.
	 To analyze the impact of agency costs and regulations on merger performance, empirical studies for historical periods are needed. Encouraged by the abundant data for the US, several event studies have been conducted for the period 1898 to 1930.​[4]​ Nevertheless, my investigation period, namely before 1914, is even more liberal concerning mergers, and regulations in Germany were less developed compared to the US. In Germany, a monopoly commission was not established, and other legal thresholds or local authorities were seldom an obstacle for mergers. Cartels and syndicates were part of the scene of the German industry,​[5]​ albeit public opinion did not favor collusion.​[6]​ Correspondingly, due to lacking regulations, acquiring firms should be able to increase their market power by merging, and the market should respond positively to merger announcements.​[7]​ Furthermore, the separation of ownership and control was not predominant, as managers were often principal shareholders.​[8]​ Members of supervisory boards had a considerable stake in the company; thereby, free rider problems did not prevent effective control of the management. Majority shareholders and integration among firms through cross-shareholding and communities of interest facilitated controlling managers. According to these highlighted discrepancies between the pre-1914 and later periods, there are two possible outcomes of my study: first, if acquiring firms exhibited increasing stock returns, moral hazard and tight regulations could be seen as good explanations for the merger paradox; second, if acquirers lost market value, one has to search for alternative theories like the minimax-regret principle (Schenk, 2001) to clarify the puzzle.
	My paper is organized as follows. First, I highlight the data collection and show descriptive findings. Second, an event study applied to daily data provides cumulated abnormal returns for targets and acquirers and underlines that the merger paradox can be rejected for the whole sample. Third, regression analyses can uncover cross-sectional differences; in particular, acquiring banks exhibited pronounced declines in share prices. 
II. The data
In contrast to Borg et al. (1989) and Leeth and Borg (1994, 2000), who used monthly stock returns, and Banerjee and Eckhard (2001) that worked with weekly data, I collected daily returns. Morse (1984) showed that the lower the frequency of returns the more cross-sectional units is needed to maintain the ability of event studies to distinguish between abnormal and normal share price movements. Hence, an event study based on daily observations possesses higher statistical power. Choosing daily data has an additional reason, namely the lack of weekly or monthly data on merger announcements. There are just two reliable sources: First, yearbooks like the ‘Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften´ provide the year of a merger; second, daily newspapers like the ‘Berliner Börsenzeitung´ published official announcements or rumors about imminent mergers. Consequently, one has to decide between working with annual or daily data. For the sake of a high quality of my event study, annual data are ruled out. 
	As a result, one has to read daily newspapers, which is time intensive and meticulous work; thus, the sampling period should be relatively short – albeit enough mergers should occur in this period. Tilly (1982) found a high merger activity in the year 1908; thus, I chose this year as sampling period.​[9]​ Out of the 101 announcements that occurred in this period, companies listed on a German stock exchange are selected, as observing share prices is a prerequisite for an event study. This reduces the sample size to 50, namely 34 acquirers and 16 targets, which is for historical data sets a usual sample size. To illustrate this point, Banerjee and Eckhard (2001) collected 56 companies and used weekly data.​[10]​ Of course, compared to event studies for the 1980s and later period, my sample is smaller – but nowadays merger announcements and daily stock returns are easily available.​[11]​ 
	The ‘Berliner Börsenzeitung´ provides daily closing prices of the Berlin stock exchange as well as other regional exchanges – but trading volumes are not available. To obtain company specific information, stock characteristics like firm size are collected from the yearbook ‘Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften´. To illustrate the quality of the sources, table I shows newspaper articles and statements in the yearbook for the merger of ‘Höchst´ and ‘Kalle & Co. AG´. ‘Höchst´ announced the merger on 11th April 1908 and convened the shareholder gathering just two days later. On 11th May 1908, the shareholder gathering accepted the acquisition; thus, it took only four weeks to conduct the merger, as authorities did not worry much about increasing market power. This case study also highlights an interesting feature of the pre-1914 corporate governance, namely communities of interest (pooling agreements) and cross-shareholding. ‘Leopold Cassella’ and ‘Hoechst’ formed a community of interest and acquired the target in a joint effort, which made the expansion cheaper without loosing control. Accordingly, this case study underlines that mergers could be executed within four weeks due to lacking legal hurdles and the integration among firms through communities of interest made acquisitions cheaper.
	To obtain an overview regarding my sample, table II shows discrepancies in merger activities among industries. Apparently, the banking industry was very active in undertaking mergers,​[12]​ whereas other industries exhibited only weak propensities to merge.​[13]​ Interestingly, shareholders or supervisory boards did not approve only two mergers out of 101. It was uncommon to replace the management of targets; hence, the replacement of an inefficient management was not regarded as potential efficiency gain from mergers. Only in three cases the management was fired; thus, a market for corporate control did not exist. In 44.3% of all cases, mergers were financed by issuing new shares and hence own shares served as ‘acquisition currency’. Accordingly, using own shares for financing external growth is not a new phenomenon of the so-called ‘New Economy’. Table III provides summary statistics for acquiring and target firms. Mergers in the banking industry differed from other industries in that targets exhibited higher price-dividend ratios. Hence, targets in the banking industry had high market valuations relative to their dividend payments.​[14]​ This fact might explain that cumulated abnormal returns in the banking industry are close to zero, whereas acquirers in other industries gained from mergers. Noteworthy, seven acquiring banks had a positive cumulated abnormal return – but seven banks lost shareholder value.

III. Results of the event study and regression models
1. The constant-mean-return model and the event-window
To determine the normal share price movement, the market model that estimates the relation between individual returns and returns of a market portfolio is usually applied.​[15]​ The market model, however, requires defining a market index on a daily basis for the estimation and event period – but such a market index did not exist in the year 1908.​[16]​ Consequently, I refer to Masulis (1980) and use the constant-mean-return (CMR) model.​[17]​ 	The CMR model assumes that stock returns are mean reverting and hence stationary. One can express this behavior of returns in the following manner.
		(1)
Note that every stock i possesses an individual mean return i, and eit denotes an error term that follows a white-noise process. The CMR model provides mean returns and variances of normal returns. These estimates are based on 50 daily returns for each stock collected 250 trading days prior to merger announcements. T-tests indicate that daily mean returns and hence normal returns are not significantly different from zero.​[18]​ 
	Abnormal returns denoted it are defined as deviations of observed daily returns during the event period from predicted normal returns i. Under the null hypothesis that the event has no economic impact, abnormal returns it are normally distributed.
it~		(2)
Accordingly, it is possible to derive an appropriate test statistic to detect whether abnormal returns differ significantly from zero.
	Thus far, abnormal returns of individual stocks at a specific day are considered; however, to improve the statistical power of the event study, I aggregate individual abnormal returns among cross-sectional units to build up portfolio weighted abnormal returns denoted t*. Besides the cross-sectional aggregation, portfolio weighted abnormal returns are added up over an increasing time interval starting at the first day of the event period. This can be justified by considering that share prices did not reflect at once the economic impact of merger announcements. The test statistic takes the following form.
		(3)
The expression  denotes the equally weighted cumulated abnormal return covering the time span from m to n. The nominator described the aggregation of portfolio weighed daily abnormal returns t* from m to n. The denominator contains the standard deviation; hereby, n represents the number of companies and T indicates the number of included days from m to n. The abbreviation tr is the trace operator. The variance of the error term of equation (1) is e2, and Var() captures the variance of the estimated mean returns.​[19]​ Correspondingly, this test statistic enables to detect abnormal stock price movements during the event period; hence, the impact of the merger announcement on stock prices can be measured. 
	Yet the accuracy of the measurement depends on the design of the event window, which is a crucial problem of event-studies – but seldom discussed. A too large event window increases the chance that other factors that are not related to the merger announcements may affect the results (see MacKinlay, 1997). In contrast, an event period that covers too few observations can be misleading because the adaptation process may not be finished yet. There exists no generally accepted method to determine an ‘optimal’ event period. To confirm my choice of the event window that starts 15 days before the announcement and ends 15 days afterwards, I calculate average p-values of abnormal returns for every day of the proposed event period and plot the resulting curve. The average p-value reaches its minimum close to the event day (see figure 1). This indicates that abnormal share price movements mainly occur during the period from eight days before to seven days after the announcement. 

2. Cumulated abnormal returns of acquirers and targets
To discuss the merger paradox, I have to evaluate whether acquirers gain from mergers; thus, the sample is divided into acquirers and targets. Targets should exhibit increases in their market value because the acquiring firm has to pay a premium to convince shareholders to give up their ownership.​[20]​ Table IV shows portfolio cumulated abnormal returns (with increasing time interval) and p-values for acquiring and target firms. Acquirers outperformed by 2.27% (p-value 0.002); consequently, on average the merger paradox can be rejected for the historical period. In addition, share prices of targets increased on average by 5.47% (p-value 0.001). This increase is relatively low compared to studies for later periods; hence, the premium that had to be paid to shareholders of targets was much lower in the year 1908 than nowadays.​[21]​ Furthermore, the adaptation process seems to differ between targets and acquiring firms. When the firm is a target, the adaptation process started at t=13, three days before the public announcement, and cumulated abnormal returns stayed highly significant till the end of the event period. In contrast, the adaptation of acquirers took place at the event day t=16 and after the disclosure of mergers. Thus, informational motivated trading seems to play a greater role for the price process of targets compared to acquirers. Noteworthy, without regulatory restrictions during the pre-1914 period, acquirers could buy stocks on the open market prior to an announcement and, hence, behave like an insider, which triggers abnormal price movements before the announcement.​[22]​ Despite these insights, one should be aware of the fact that the sample size is rather small and outliers could affect the average performance of acquirers. The subsequent section highlights the performance on a firm-specific level and introduces multivariate models to uncover cross-sectional differences concerning the success of acquirers.

3. Why did some acquirers loose while others succeeded? 
Cumulated abnormal returns for the whole portfolio of acquirers are positive and indicate a rejection of the merger paradox – but not necessarily for every acquirer or industry. To illustrate this point, figure 2 plots cumulated abnormal returns for losers and winners and 95% confidence intervals. In spite of gains for the whole portfolio, 15 acquirers lost on average 2.25% (p-value 0.000), whereas 19 gained on average 5.11% (p-value 0.000). Correspondingly, I focus on individual companies, to reveal why some acquirers lost and other outperformed strongly.
	To uncover company specific factors that made an acquirer successful, I regress cumulated abnormal returns CARi on stock market characteristics; table V reports the outcomes accompanied by the Ramsey Reset omitted variables test, and the Breusch-Pagan test on heteroscedasticity.​[23]​
		(4)
Sizei…	Market capitalization of acquirer i
	Cashi…	Dummy that takes value one if cash finances the merger
	PDRi…	Price-dividend ratio
	DGi…	Annual growth rate of dividend payments (1906 to 1908)
	Banki…	Dummy for the banking industry
	Miningi…	Dummy for the mining industry
As information about all targets is not available, I cannot calculate the relative size – the ratio between the firm size of acquirers and targets – thus, one can only control for the size of the acquirer measured by its market capitalization. The way of financing a merger is essential for the performance, as cash payments tend to be more successful (see Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). As earnings reported in balance sheets were not reliable for the pre-1914 period, I used dividends as a proxy. Dividend yields were quite high and reached on average 6.02% for acquirers; thus, a considerable share of profits was issued. Price-dividend ratios can be used to distinguish between over- and undervalued stocks. To obtain an impression concerning the development of profits prior to mergers, I calculated the annual growth rates of dividends based on a three-year period. As banks and mining companies are very active acquirers, dummy variables control for industry specific effects.​[24]​
	The Breusch-Pagan test indicates heteroscedasticity, which might bias p-values; thus, table V reports robust p-values derived from the Huber-White Sandwich estimator. The Ramsey Reset test uncovers an omitted variable bias, which makes the OLS regression disputable. This finding might be due to outliers that affect the Ramsey Reset test. To overcome this problem, I refer to quantile regressions that focus on specific quantiles of variables and are thus less influenced by outliers. An interquantile regression can reveal company specific factors that are responsible for the pronounced under- or overperformance of an acquirer. Table V shows the results of an interquantile regression for the 10% and 90% quantile. The coefficient for banks is negative and highly significant; hence, it is more likely that banks are at the bottom than at the top of the distribution of cumulated abnormal returns. This clearly points to the underperformance of this industry, despite the fact that banks accounted for 39.2% (see table II) of all mergers. As a matter of fact, banks failed to gain from mergers at least in the short-run despite the absence of regulations and principal-agent issues. One can argue that banks were in a consolidation period, and mergers could have improved their market position in the long run. Of course, my event study cannot detect long-term benefits of mergers and balance sheet data are not reliable to conduct a long-term outcome study. Kling (2006), however, showed based on panel VAR models and annual data that German banks conducted unsuccessful mergers even in the long run. However, the panel VAR study is not appropriate and did not attempt to quantify the effect of merger announcements, as other circumstances (i.e. restructuring of companies etc.) could affect the measurement. Fortunately, Schenk (2001) offered an alternative explanation for the merger paradox, which fits to my empirical finding that banks were not successful – but very active in undertaking mergers. The minimax-regret principle would suggest that banks observed mergers of other banks and tended to imitate these decisions in order to avoid the regret of overlooking a wealth-creating merger. The regret of conducting an unsuccessful merger was minor, as other banks did the same move; hence, a failure would be regarded as common failure of the industry and not of an individual bank. This behavior follows the assertion that one prefers to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.

IV. Conclusion
Does the merger paradox exist even without any regulations? On average the merger paradox can be rejected in 1908 for German companies because acquiring companies exhibited an increase in their stock prices of 2.27%. Leeth and Borg (1994) that covered the period from 1905 to 1930 did not reject the merger paradox for their 191 mergers occurring among U.S. manufacturing companies. They found considerable gains prior to the merger for acquirers; however, this increase in market values was outweighed by a pronounced decline by 25% after the transaction. Borg et al. (1989) confirmed these findings for the period from 1919 to 1930. Hence, even in the 1920s during the second merger wave, a period with tighter regulations, mergers were as unsuccessful as in the period from 1905 to 1930. In Germany, regulations were less effective and collusive behavior (i.e. cartels) was hardly restricted. Besides this difference in the legal framework, the ownership structure differed in that principal-agent problems were less severe, as ownership and control was in many cases not separated. Even if it was separated, majority shareholders, and the integration of companies through communities of interest and cross-shareholding controlled mangers effectively. 
	Multivariate analyses emphasize that acquiring banks belonged mainly to the group of losers, in spite of the fact that banks were very active in undertaking mergers. This puzzling finding might be explained by Schenk’s (2001) minimax-regret game in which imitating the move of others is the driving force for the merger paradox. As banks accounted for about 40% of all mergers, one can state that the banking industry was in a merger wave; hence, banks tended to imitate mergers of other banks even when these transactions were not successful. Kling (2006) confirmed this assertion by modeling the individual merger decision of German banks from 1870 to 1914.
	My study shows that in the absence of regulation and without considerable principal-agent problems, mergers can be profitable for acquirers and not only for targets. Event studies based on US data confirmed the merger paradox and uncovered that the performance remains more or less stable over time. German data, however, suggest that the merger paradox can be rejected except for the banking industry. The US studies for the pre-1930 period also analyzed a period of weak regulations; thus, my finding might be due to corporate governance differences, as Germany was and to some extent still is a bank-based system with majority shareholders. This reduces incentive problems caused by the separation of ownership and control, and mergers that are beneficial for principal shareholders were more likely.
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Table I. The case of ‘Höchst´ and ‘Kalle & Co. AG´ 
To illustrate the details provided by my data sources, table I summarizes information on the acquisition of ‘Kalle & Co. AG´.
Date of the newspaper announcements	Newspaper announcements in chronological order‘Berliner Börsenzeitung´	Information provided by the year book ‘Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften´
11th April 1908Morning issue, insert II	“‘Höchster Farbwerke´ acquires ‘Kalle & Co. AG´ by issuing new shares. Already prior to this announcement rumors spread about an impending increase in nominal capital of ‘Höchster Farbwerke´”	“To deepen the relation between ‘Höchster Farbwerke´ and ‘Kalle & Co. AG´ an agreement was signed in 1908 to acquire shares from former principal shareholders. This acquisition was undertaken together with ‘Leopold Cassella & Co. GmbH´ and reached a volume of 4,000,000 Mark (nominal capital). The  ‘Höchster Farbwerke´ now own shares with a nominal capital of 3,200,000 Mark, whereas ‘Leopold Cassella & Co. GmbH´ own 800,000 Mark in nominal capital”
12th April 1908Sunday issue, page 15	“‘Höchster Farbwerke´ announces its annual accounts and also stresses that the management of the target firm should stay in charge after the acquisition of ‘Kalle & Co. AG´”	
13th April 1908Morning issue, insert IV	“‘Höchster Farbwerke´ convenes a shareholder gathering to decide about the issue of new shares and the acquisition. The gathering will take place on 9th May 1908”	
19th April 1908Sunday issue, insert II	“The shareholder gathering of ‘Kalle & Co. AG´ will be held on 11th May 1908”	
9th May 1908Evening issue, page four	“The shareholder gathering of ‘Höchster Farbwerke´ approves the increase of nominal capital by 10.5 million Mark. The nominal capital now reaches 36 million Mark.”	
11th May 1908Morning issue, page 14	“The shareholder gathering of ‘Höchster Farbwerke´ accepts the acquisition of ‘Kalle & Co. AG´. A part of the acquired shares that represent 4 million Mark in nominal capital will be passed on to ‘Leopold Cassella & Co. GmbH´ with which a pooling agreement exists”	
12th May 1908Evening issue, page 11	“Shareholder gathering of ‘Kalle & Co. AG´ approves the offer”	
Source: The indicated issues of the ‘Berliner Börsenzeitung´ and the ‘Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften´, issue for the years 1913-1914, volume I, page 1600-1602.

Table II. Merger activities in different industries
Table II summarizes the number of mergers within each industry and the contribution, in percent, of the respective category to the whole merger activities.














Table III. Summary statistics for acquirers and targets
The table shows the mean of market capitalization, price-dividend ratio, growth rates of dividends, cash payment, and cumulated abnormal returns for acquirers and targets. Figures refer to the whole sample, banks and non-financial corporations respectively.
Relevant sample	Market capitalization in million Mark	Price-dividend ratio	Growth rates of dividends 	Cash payment 	Cumulated abnormal return 
All acquirers	46.44	16.61	-10.28%	50.00%	1.72%
All targets	20.73 	12.15	-9.78% 	35.71% 	5.10%
Bank as acquirer	73.50	17.73	-1.55%	64.29% 	0.10%
Bank as target	14.76	22.63	-4.17% 	0.00%	3.04%
Non-financial acquirer	25.41	15.74	-17.07% 	38.89% 	2.99% 








Table IV. Cumulated abnormal returns of acquirers and targets


























Table V. OLS regression and interquantile regression for acquirers
Based on the Huber-White Sandwich estimator, p-values are robust against heteroscedasticity in the OLS regression; however, the Ramsey Reset test uncovers an omitted variable bias, which might be due to outliers. The p-values for the interquantile regression are derived from a bootstrapping distribution with 100 replications. 
Explanatory variable	OLS regression	Interquantile regression
Intercept	10.7200 (0.098)	42.5001 (0.013)








Pseudo R2 for 10% quantile	-	0.25
Pseudo R2 for 90% quantile	-	0.36
F-Test (p-value)	1.71 (0.161)	-
Breusch-Pagan Chi2 (p-value)	31.67 (0.000)	-


















^1	  For extensive surveys on the topic, I refer to Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), Schwert (1996), and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001).
^2	  Among many other contributions, allowing cost asymmetry and a different strategic behavior (i.e. Stackelberg leader) of the merged entity (see Levin, 1990) could create profitable mergers. Also in the case of strategic complements (see Gaudet and Salant, 1992), mergers are profitable.  
^3	  Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) pointed out that the merger paradox could be confirmed in the 1980s due to tight regulations. 
^4	  Eis (1971) and Nelson (1959) are the most elaborate data sources for the US. The analysis conducted by Leeth and Borg (1994, 2000) covered the period from 1905 to 1930, and Banerjee and Eckhard (2001) investigated the first merger wave from 1898 to 1904. Borg et al. (1989) studied the second merger wave in the 1920s.
^5	  Fremdling and Krengel (1985) provided an overview on the importance of cartels in the German industry.
^6	  Gömmel (1985) argued that more than three fourth of the newspapers criticized the formation of cartels and syndicates.  
^7	  The first merger wave that occurred in the pre-1914 period – based on the investigation by Banerjee and Eckhard (2001) for the US as well as Kling (2006) and Tilly (1982) for Germany – can be characterized as ‘mergers to monopoly’.
^8	  Fohlin (2005) stressed the high level of concentration of ownership and control due to family dynasties, cross-ownership among companies, relationship banking (bank involved in ownership and control of non-financial corporations).
^9	  Tilly (1982) argued that choosing a specific time interval, during which as much information as possible is accumulated, is an appropriate method of sampling in economic history.
^10	  To compare my sample size with a later study on Germany, I refer to Bühner (1991). He conducted a long-horizon event study covering the period 1971-1985 and included 110 mergers. 
^11	  Nevertheless, my sample size is in line with simulation experiments conducted by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). Morse (1984) emphasized that working with daily returns the econometric power of an event study should be high even for a smaller cross-sectional dimension.
^12	  Kling (2006) found that even for the period 1870 to 1913, banks are responsible for more than 50% of all mergers. Hence, my finding is not specific for the year 1908. Kling (2006) explained this finding by the introduction of the new exchange law 1896, which favored large banks.
^13	  Due to lacking information, descriptive statistics about the line of business, approval of shareholders, change of target’s management, and the way of financing the expansion are only available for 79 out of 101 announced mergers.
^14	  As reported earnings are due to lacking accounting standards not reliable, I used dividends as proxy for earnings, which is acceptable, as a considerable amount of profits was issued. Dividend payments played a crucial role for investors, and newspapers reported changes in dividends frequently. 
^15	  The appendix shows portfolio weighted abnormal returns for a sample of mergers announced in 2000. This sample contains 60 German companies. Regardless of using the market model or the CMR model, the abnormal returns are nearly identical. In 2000, one can rely on the DAX30 or DAX100 to estimate the market model.
^16	  There are two constructed market indices on a monthly basis, namely the ‘Donnerindex´ and the more valid Eube (1998) index. Both are not widely accepted.
^17	  Armitage (1995) wrote a very detailed review on event study methods and highlighted the pros and cons of every procedure.
^18	  T-values reach on average –0.1325.
^19	  Adding the term Var() deviates from the standard CMR described by Masulis (1980) – but it is common for market models. This term inserts the precision of the estimated normal return into the standard deviation of abnormal returns. Hence, it is a more careful testing procedure.
^20	  There are innumerable theoretical as well as empirical studies regarding the takeover premium for voting shares. For instance, a recent empirical study of Rydqvist (1996) focused on the Swedish stock market. He regressed the relative voting premium on a variable that measures the competitiveness of the company’s ownership structure. A takeover premium is only paid for voting shares. Hence, the difference between voting and non-voting share prices the so-called voting premium should rise, if the probability of a takeover increases or if there is a rumor about an imminent takeover. 
^21	  Even Eckbo (1986) who investigated Canadian mergers from 1964 to 1983 found a higher increase in market values of target firms. He detected cumulated abnormal returns of about 10%, which is clearly the lowest value I found in the literature.
^22	  Banerjee and Eckhard (2001) confirmed pre-announcement gains for the US from 1898 to 1904.
^23	  Binder (1985) introduced multivariate regressions for event-studies.
^24	  Adding more industry dummies does not affect my results, as other industries are of minor importance.
